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I. INTRODUCTION
In whose interests are corporations governed? In whose
interests should they be governed? These foundational questions
in corporate law have been debated since at least the Berle-Dodd
exchange in the 1930s.' Most American commentators have
asserted a simple answer: the interests of shareholders.
The debate flared up in the 1980s as states began to pass
corporate constituency statutes. These statutes allow corporate
officers and directors to take into account the interests of a variety
of corporate stakeholders in carrying out their fiduciary duties to
the corporation. The statutes suggest that a corporation should, or
at least may, be run in the interests of more groups than just
shareholders. The corporate constituency statutes therefore
threaten decades of American thinking about the governance of
corporations. As a result, many scholarly papers have appeared
attacking or defending the constituency statutes.
On their face, constituency statutes seem attractive to someone
with an interest in employee involvement in corporate governance.
However, the statutes were passed in response to the takeover wave
of the '80s, and many commentators have charged that their main
intent and effect is to help entrench incumbent managers. This
aspect of the statutes is far from attractive (unless you are an
incumbent manager). This article tries to sort out these conflicting
perspectives. I ultimately conclude that while there are some
decent arguments for constituency statutes, and they are not as
harmful as many of their opponents feared, they are, all in all, not a
good idea. They are a poor substitute for direct employee
involvement in corporate governance.
This article provides a simple, formal model of the interaction
among managers, shareholders, and employees in governing a
business organization. Most formal work in corporate governance
focuses only on the relationship between managers and
shareholders. There has been relatively little formal modeling that
includes employees as an important constituency in governance.
To ask questions about constituency statutes and employee
governance, one must extend that traditional framework.
Section II examines the constituency statutes and the scholarly
1. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Power in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049
(1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees ?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932).
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literature on them. It also examines related literature on the
effects of takeovers on employees and on employee involvement in
corporate governance.
Section III presents the basic formal model. A manager
chooses how much effort to undertake, which affects both the total
output of the firm and benefits personal to the manager. The
manager also chooses how much of the total output to allocate to
employees rather than shareholders. A variety of mechanisms
induce the manager to take into account the effects of output
received on both shareholders and employees, but not fully. As a
result, the manager tends to set effort too low.
Section IV extends the model to add in the effects of a
takeover threat. If the amount of firm output allocated to
shareholders is lowered, the possibility of a takeover increases, and
if a takeover occurs, the manager is punished. As a result, the
manager both increases her effort level and allocates a greater
fraction of output to shareholders. Shareholders are better off,
while the effect on employees is ambiguous.
Section V then considers the effect of existing constituency
statutes. These statutes allow managers to take defensive actions
that reduce the threat of a takeover, claiming such actions benefit
other constituencies. The effect of this use of the statutes as a
shield for managers is to reduce both managerial effort and the
amount of output allocated to shareholders. Shareholders are
worse off, while the effect on employees is ambiguous.
Section VI models employee involvement in corporate
governance. It does so by assuming that employees have some
ability to punish or eliminate managers with whom they are
unhappy. The possibility of such punishment occurring increases
as the amount of output that employees receive decreases. As with
a takeover threat, this mechanism increases managerial effort.
Unlike takeovers, this mechanism induces managers to allocate
more output to employees as opposed to shareholders. Thus,
employees are better off, while the effect on shareholders is
ambiguous.
Section VII sets out the final variant of the formal model. This
involves using constituency statutes as a sword against management,
rather than a shield. Employees, shareholders, or perhaps others
can sue managers. The chance of such suit increases as total
output decreases. This mechanism is intermediate between
takeovers and employee governance in terms of its distributive
2004] 1229
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effects, although probably empirically weaker than either in terms
of its effect on managerial effort.
Section VIII concludes with a discussion of the formal model,
relating it to the issues from the literature discussed in section II. It
suggests several conclusions:
* Economic models of corporate governance, which
have focused mainly on managers and shareholders,
should take into account a variety of other
stakeholder groups-sections III through VII add
employees to the model.
" While many commentators have concluded that
shareholder gains in hostile takeovers do not come in
part at the expense of employees, that issue is far from
conclusively decided. While the literature has focused
on employee losses through lowered employment or
wage levels, changes in working conditions and other
intangibles should be examined as well.
" There is a redistributive argument in favor of a
fiduciary duty to employees. Serving as agents for
shareholders may help employees, which we want to
encourage if we think employees deserve a greater
slice of the pie.
* While a revised fiduciary duty and employee
governance may both help tilt the playing field toward
employees, the revised fiduciary duty does so at the
cost of lessened discipline of managers, whereas
employee involvement in governance may help
control managerial opportunism. In other words,
while a broadened fiduciary duty may help distribute
income from shareholders to employees, it does so at
the cost of reduced efficiency; employee governance
may redistribute income and power while improving
efficiency. Thus, employee involvement in corporate
governance is more desirable than constituency
statutes.
II. THE LITERATURE
A. The Statutes
The first corporate constituency statute was passed in 1983 in
1230 [Vol. 30:4
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Pennsylvania. A total of thirty states now have some variant of a
2
corporate constituency statute. Under these statutes, a
corporation's officers and directors are allowed to give weight to
the interests of enumerated groups other than shareholders in the
performance of their fiduciary duties. The statutes differ along a
variety of dimensions. For example, they differ as to which
constituent groups are included. All statutes mention employees
and customers; other groups mentioned include suppliers,
creditors, local communities, and the state and national economies.
Most, though not all, statutes specify that directors may consider
the long-term as well as the short-term interest of the corporation.'
The statutes are generally vague as to how directors should
weigh the interests of varying groups. A few specify that no single
interest may dominate; most do not even say that much.4 In a few
states the statutes apply only in the context of a potential change in
control.' In almost all of the states the statutes are permissive, not
mandatory. That is, directors may take the interests of the
enumerated groups into account, but they are not required to.5 In
several states the enumerated groups (other than shareholders) are
explicitly denied standing to sue under the statute; in other states
the lack of standing appears implicit. In several states, a
corporation either must opt in for the statute to apply, or may opt
8
out.
Of note in the provisions just listed is the permissive nature of
the statutes in almost all states and the lack of standing of
constituent group members to sue under the statutes. These
features lend credence to the charge that the statutes reduce the
disciplinary pressure of shareholder suits on directors without a
concomitant increase in pressure from other groups. The statutes
are a shield for managers, not a sword for employees or other non-
shareholder groups.
To date, it appears that constituency statutes have had very
little use in the courtroom. Few court cases have even mentioned
constituency statutes, and the statutes do not seem to have been
2. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM1. L. 85, 95 (1999).
3. Id. at 97.
4. Id. at 98.
5. Id. at 100.
6. Id. at 101.
7. See id. at 108.
8. See id. at 101-02.
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decisive for the outcome in cases that do mention such statutes. 9
Of course, whether the statutes have affected actual behavior is a
more difficult question.
One possible reason that constituency statutes appear to have
had little visible impact is that they were adopted at the same time
that states also adopted other anti-takeover statutes. Perhaps even
more importantly, corporations adopted a variety of anti-takeover
devices, such as poison pills, staggered boards, elimination of
written consents, supermajority provisions, interested shareholder
provisions, and the like. Common law in the leading corporate
law state, Delaware, has largely allowed boards to adopt these
measures with little interference. Thus, directors and officers have
found a variety of means to defend their interests. When pressed
in court, they generally have been able to defend those means
without resort to constituency statutes. If managers can so defend
their actions without using constituency statutes, they prefer to do
so, as admitting in court that an action is defensible only by
reference to groups other than shareholders is not likely to help
the corporation's share price.
B. Arguments Against and For the Statutes
The traditional view in American corporate law has been that
the fiduciary duties of corporate directors run to the shareholders
of the corporation." There have been times when that was
debated, most notably the Berle-Dodd debate of the 1930s.12 There
are doctrines that to a degree soften shareholder dominance. For
instance, corporate charitable giving is allowed; it is defended as
being in the long-term interest of the corporation." In Unocal, the
Delaware Supreme Court left some room for the consideration of
" 'constituencies' other than shareholders,"' 4 although it does not
appear that a decision can be defended if it hurts shareholders.
The dominant view, though, clearly has been that directors and
officers are to run the corporation in the interests of shareholders,
9. See id. at 108.
10. See id. at 109; Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 38 (1992).
11. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 499, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
12. See Berle, supra note 1; Dodd, supra note 1.
13. See JESSE H. CHOPER et al., CASES AND MATERIAL ON CORPORATIONS 40-41
(5th ed. 2000).
14. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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and shareholders alone.
Corporate constituency statutes challenge that dominant view.
It is therefore no surprise that many have opposed them.15 The
traditional argument for the dominant view is that shareholders are
the owners of the corporation. Hence they have the right to expect
that their property is managed in their interest.16 This traditional
argument is in considerable tension with the contractarian point of
view, which has come into vogue with the infusion of economic
thought into corporate law scholarship. This view portrays the
corporation as a nexus of contracts between a variety of parties that
interact through the corporation, potentially including all of the
groups mentioned in corporate constituency statutes. The
corporation is merely a convenient legal fiction, which may help
structure these interactions. The question for corporate law, on
this approach, is what set of legal rules provides the most efficient
set of incentives for the parties. Particular attention is paid to the
ways in which laws may help constrain the potential opportunism of
managers in a large public corporation. Under this approach,
there is nothing necessarily special about the status of shareholders
as owners of the corporation. That label simply begs all of the
interesting questions about the incentives different potential legal
• 17
rules provide.
Although contractarianism calls into question the traditional
argument for a shareholder-only fiduciary duty, it leads to several
arguments of its own for that position. Shareholders are the
residual claimants for a corporation. They receive what is left of a
corporation's earnings after all other contractually required
15. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. RET. 23 (1991); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97 (1991); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against
Fiduciay Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996); Committee
on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential For Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW.
2253 (1990). There is a fairly large literature on constituency statutes, which I
only sample here. My point in this section is simply to give a quick sense of some
of the major arguments made for and against constituency statutes and corporate
governance, in order to set the stage for the argument I make in the following
sections.
16. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C.L. REV.
283, 288-89 (1998).
17. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1204
(1991).
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payments are made. Only residual claimants have the proper
incentive to maximize the total net value that a corporation creates;
holders of fixed claims only care about ensuring that the
obligations to them are fulfilled. Because shareholders bear the
risk that a corporation faces, they need to be able to control its
decisions."'
One problem with this argument is that shareholders are
frequently not the only residual claimants. Employees may well be
residual claimants too. Employees may possess skills and
knowledge that are specific to their particular corporation and of
little or no value if they were to become employed elsewhere. To
the extent that this is so, employees, like shareholders, have an
interest whose value varies with the long-term value of the
corporation. 9 Another problem with this approach is that the law
does not really treat shareholders as residual claimants.
A related argument is that, as residual claimants, shareholders
care about a uniquely wide range of managerial decisions
concerning the corporation. It is not possible to completely
contract over all these decisions. Although a variety of other
mechanisms protect the interests of shareholders thus exposed, a
court-imposed fiduciary duty helps protect shareholders further.2°
The response is that employees also care about a wide range of
decisions within the corporation, and are similarly unable to
completely contract over them.21 Some contractarians argue that
employees care about a more limited range of decisions than
shareholders, particularly employment decisions, wages and
benefits, and some aspects of working conditions. They also argue
that employees can protect themselves better contractually.
22
However, it would appear that quite a wide range of decisions
within a corporation affect the well-being of employees. "Working
conditions" covers most of what goes on within a corporation.
Most adult Americans spend a large number of hours working in a
corporation; what goes on during that time is of intense interest to
18. See Macey, supra note 15, at 26-31.
19. See Greenfield, supra note 16, at 305-08; Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (2002).
20. See Macey, supra note 15, at 36-39; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION
LAW AND ECONOMIcs 424-26 (2002).
21. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 15; see also Stout,
supra note 19, at 1196; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 318-22 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout].
22. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 428-29.
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them. Indeed, on its face it would appear that employees, who
unlike shareholders are not diversified, are more seriously exposed
to the consequences of managerial decisions than are shareholders
and have fewer disciplinary mechanisms available to them. (One
consequence is that, like managers and creditors, employees are
likely to prefer lower-risk decisions than shareholders would
prefer). The ability of many, indeed most, American workers today
to protect their interests contractually is quite questionable.
2 3
Another major argument for a shareholder-only duty is that a
more diffuse duty owed to many groups would make the fiduciary
duty of little value to anyone. The more groups who receive the
benefit of such a duty, the more likely it is that the interests of
24those groups will conflict. Where interests conflict, managers may
play one group off against another in defending their actions.
Courts will have a hard time aggregating conflicting interests, and
hence will go along with the managers' defense. Why, then, focus
on shareholders only, as opposed to some other group? It may be
easier to measure returns to shareholders than returns to other25
groups. Fiduciary duties have their most legitimate bite in
situations where the interests of corporate managers go against the
interests of all other stakeholder groups, and hence the conflicting
interest problem does not arise. The application of a fiduciary duty
to shareholders in circumstances where the interests of various
stakeholders (other than managers) collide is a less legitimate use
of fiduciary duty.
2 6
I find the last-mentioned "too-many-masters" argument the
most compelling of all those made against constituency statutes. It
may well explain why the statutes came into being in the first place.
The statutes were passed in the context of the hostile takeover wave
of the 1980s. In many states, the management of embattled
corporations was the impetus for the statutes. This history helps
explain why the statutes are permissive rather than mandatory. On
the other hand, at least some observers believe that other corporate
constituencies, especially employees (and particularly unions) did
23. See O'Connor, supra note 17, at 1214-17; Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at
318-22.
24. See O'Connor, supra note 17, at 1214-17; Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at
318-22.; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 421.
25. See Stout, supra note 19, at 1200.
26. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579, 592-94 (1992).
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support the statutes once they were raised as an issue. 7 The
takeovers of the '80s seem to have caused much anxiety for many
employees and their political supporters, which may have made the
statutes popular. An important question is thus the extent and
frequency to which hostile takeovers go against the interests of
employees.
C. The Effects of Takeovers
A related literature has considered the effects of hostile
takeovers on various corporate stakeholder groups.2s Takeovers
tend to generate a great deal of wealth for the shareholders of
target companies. A major question has been whether this
increased wealth is due to enhanced productivity and efficiency, or
whether it comes in part at the expense of other stakeholders.
Of most interest here is the claim that perhaps some of the
gains to target shareholders come at the expense of the employees
of the target corporation. One widely cited article by Andrei
Shleifer and Lawrence Summers posited that hostile takeovers may
serve as ways to break implicit contracts between corporations and
29their employees. Such contracts may exist to help overcome
incentive problems created by employee investment in firm-specific
human capital. Such investment leaves employees vulnerable to
opportunism by management, which may not increase wages as
promised in response to the investment. Although there may be
other mechanisms, such as corporate reputation, to deal with this
problem, Shleifer and Summers suggested that corporations may
instill a culture and set of values in managers so that they care
about how their decisions affect employees and do not want to
break implicit contracts with them, even when it may be in the
shareholder's interest to do so. Managers loyal to employees, in
other words, may act as a corporate commitment device. Hostile
takeovers, which replace such loyal managers with ones who have
no ties to existing employees, may breach that commitment. An
example may be the classic case of Cheff v. Mathes,3' where
management bought back shares from a potential hostile acquirer
27. See Springer, supra note 2, at 95-96.
28. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988).
29. See id. at 41-42.
30. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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allegedly to alleviate the fears of its sales force. That "allegedly"
points to the core problem in this area-it could be that the real
point of the share buyback was to protect the current managers.
The Shleifer and Summers article led to much comment and
debate, but not all that much systematic empirical investigation.
Many anecdotal tales support the story of takeovers leading to
drastic cuts in employment and/or wages. However, there is little
statistical evidence supporting the claim that such anecdotes are
typical." Indeed, the few empirical studies on point suggest no
tendency for hostile takeovers to result in lower wages or
employment within the target corporations." However, one study
by Brian Becker does suggest that takeovers may lead to worsened
work conditions for employees. 33 However, Becker reaches this
result by examining the differential size of takeover premiums in
unionized and non-unionized target firms and finding the
premiums are greater in unionized firms. He reasons that unions
help employees achieve better work conditions, and that the
premiums are higher in unionized firms because the takeovers help
shareholders take back those employee gains.34 The point is very
interesting, but the empirical evidence he presents is too indirect
to be confident in his conclusion. Perhaps the difference between
union and non-union firms is due to differences in work
conditions, but perhaps there are other reasons for the union/non-
union differences. More direct measures of working conditions
would be preferable, though difficult to obtain.
Oliver Williamson raised another issue in a comment on the
Shleifer and Summers article. Shleifer and Summers posit that
there are managers who loyally stick by employees even where
immediate corporate incentives suggest they should not. Such
behavior may be an optimal form of assuring implicit contracts with
the employees, but it may instead be an instance of managerial
31. See O'Connor, supra note 17, at 1200-02.
32. See Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisition on
Labor, in TAKEovERs: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988);
David Neumark & Steven Sharpe, Rents and Quasi-Rents in the Wage Structure:
Evidence for Hostile Takeovers, Joshua Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain
Takeover Premium?: The Evidence on Contract Wages, 27J. FIN. ECON. 263 (1990).
33. Brian I. Becker, Union Rents As a Source of Takeover Gains Among Target
Shareholders, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REv. 3 (1995).
34. See id.
35. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comment, in TAKEovERS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988).
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opportunism. Managers who value a quiet life may make overly
generous concessions to employees. The discipline imposed by
takeovers may induce management to roll back those concessions.
If the firm survives as a result of some employee losses, the
remaining employees may be better off.
Thus, it is unclear whether or not hostile takeovers, or the
threat thereof, have significantly hurt employee well-being. If they
have, it is not clear whether this is due to a socially suboptimal
reneging on implicit contracts or rather to an all-in-all beneficial
tightening of organizational slack. One possibility is that takeovers
lead to worsened working conditions for employees, for which they
are not adequately compensated by increased wages. The change
in working conditions may indeed lead to a net increase in
efficiency (measured in the Kaldor-Hicks sense), 6 but may be a loss
to employees. I model this possibility in section IV.
D. Employee Governance
Recognizing a fiduciary duty in favor of employees is an
indirect way of trying to ensure that corporations are governed in
part in the interest of employees. A direct route is to have
employees themselves involved in corporate governance. This
could take the form of employee share ownership, electing
employee representatives to the board of directors, employee
involvement in quality circles, work councils, or the like. There is
scattered but somewhat substantial literature on employee
governance, with much debate over its likely effects.37
Through their jobs employees gain much information about
how things are going within a corporation, and how they might go
better. Employees often have a good sense of which managers are
doing a good job, and which are not. On many matters employees
are likely to be better informed than the scattered small
shareholders of a public corporation. This may make employees
more effective monitors of managers than shareholders. 3
36. That is, those who gain are able to compensate those who lose and still be
better off after the compensation, although this potential compensation need not
actually take place.
37. For a recent selection of related work, see MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARKJ.
ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOvERNANCE (1999). For a good earlier paper, see
Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 159 (1991).
38. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. OF
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 133 (1985). Eugene Fama has argued that lower level
1238 [Vol. 30:4
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Employees, who after all work together daily, may also be better
able to overcome collective action problems, which notoriously
plague scattered shareholders of a public corporation.
Employee governance may also be an effective commitment
device to induce employees to invest in firm-specific human capital.
I described above the incentive problems that may stop employees
from making such investments. If the employees are assured that
decisions will be made with their interests in mind, they are likely
to be less worried about any possible holdup problem that may
arise after they invest in firm-specific human capital."
Employee governance may also be an effective motivational
device. If such governance increases employee loyalty to the
corporation, they may be induced to work harder and better with
less monitoring of their effort or with lower wages. They may also
be more likely to engage in mutual monitoring of their fellow
employees.0
Some also advocate employee governance for non-efficiency
reasons. Such governance may shift the distribution of income and
wealth more in favor of employees, which would please those of an
egalitarian bent. Employee governance may be valued for its own
sake-both for psychological reasons such as reducing alienation
and increasing work satisfaction, and for philosophical reasons tied
to the value of democracy.4'
Despite these potential advantages, employee governance is
not widely observed. There are debates as to why, but skeptics have
pointed to a number of potential disadvantages. External investors
in both the bond and equity markets may be reluctant to invest in
employee-governed corporations. If employee governance is
linked to employee ownership, this may leave employees badly
managers are often good monitors of higher level managers. See Eugene F. Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 293 (1980).
39. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899
(1993); Blair & Stout, supra note 21. Employees may invest in firm-specific human
capital by, e.g., the expenditure of valuable time learning information and
procedures that are specific to the firm.
40. See Gregory Dow & Louis Putterman, Wiy Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: An
Assessment of Proposed Explanations, in BLAIR & ROE, supra note 37, at 25-26; Eugene
Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 801
(1992).
41. See Brett McDonnell, ESOPs' Failures: Fiduciary Duties Wen Managers of
Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 199,
238-41 (2000).
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underdiversified. Investment in firm-specific physical capital may
be more significant than in firm-specific human capital. Employee
ownership or control may discourage external takeovers, thus
weakening that source of managerial discipline. Employees as a
group may have more divergent interests than shareholders as a
group, and so employee involvement in governance may lead to
high decision-making costs.42  Vesting authority in the board of
directors may allow better coordination and monitoring of
decisions, and effective vesting of authority may be inconsistent
with mechanisms that subject the board to voting on its decisions. 3
In this article I do not try to weigh these various benefits and
44
costs of employee governance. My concern here is with the
comparison between corporate constituency statutes and employee
governance. Much support of the former seems to stem from a
support for the latter. I am sympathetic to the position that their
effects are similar. Indeed, I will note some arguments in its favor.
It would appear that both the constituency statutes and employee
governance are likely to have distributive effects that favor
employees, although probably the effects are much stronger in the
case of employee governance. I also agree that employees often
have a long-term stake in the success of their corporation that at
least equals, and often much exceeds, the stake of shareholders.
Moreover, employees may well be less able to protect those
interests than are shareholders. For instance, exit is generally
much easier for shareholders than for employees, at least in public
corporations.
However, constituency statutes strike me as inferior to
employee governance. For one, where the statutes and employee
governance do have similar effects, the latter is likely to have much
stronger effects. Thus, if increasing employees' share of the
surplus is desirable, then employee governance is likely to achieve
this more than constituency statutes. Of course, if one opposes
increasing the share employees receive, this will make employee
governance appear less attractive.
Furthermore, in at least one important way constituency
statutes and employee governance have different effects.
42. See Dow & Putterman, supra note 40, for an overview.
43. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 201-03.
44. Indeed, I am skeptical about our ability to do so in any systematic,
persuasive way. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the
Boardroom, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503 (2000).
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Constituency statutes make corporate managers less subject to
disciplinary pressures. They weaken the effect of hostile takeovers
by helping managers defend against such takeovers. Employee
governance, in contrast, is a potentially powerful way of disciplining
managers, as employees have much information about the
effectiveness of managers as well as incentive to use that
information. I should point out, though, that some argue that
employee governance can have very high costs.46 I leave to another
47day discussion of the costs of employee governance.
III. THE BASIC MODEL
One thing at least is clear about the matters discussed in the
previous section. More than just shareholders, managers, and the
board of directors interact within a corporation. We need to
understand how these groups interact with others, and how
interactions among these groups affect others. The particular
group on which I focus is employees. Standard economic models
of firms focus only on shareholders and managers, using a
principal-agent model. This clearly needs to be expanded. In this
section I describe and analyze a simple formal model of the
interaction among shareholders, employees, and managers. Later
sections expand the basic model to include the effects of takeover
threats, employee involvement in governance, and constituency
45. The model in this article assumes employee involvement in corporate
governance either through a significant ownership stake or else through board
representation. It does so by focusing on the ability of employees to replace
managers. Employee knowledge and interest, however, may actually be best used
at a lower level of the firm. I do not model such lower-level employee governance
here. Note that when I speak of an employee ownership share, I mean ownership
of the firm in which they work. Involvement in other firms, e.g., through union
pension funds, does not fit this model.
46. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-92 (1996);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856 (1997) (book
review).
47. But see infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
48. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990). A notable exception is Jean Tirole,
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organization, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 181 (1986). Masahiko Aoki has presented a cooperative bargaining theory of
the firm in which employees are featured. See MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE
GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984).
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statutes.
A firm in the basic model has three constituencies: a manager,
shareholders, and employees. Only the manager's decisions are
explicitly modeled; the reactions of shareholders and employees
appear implicitly as effects of those decisions. The manager makes
two decisions, one of which is the manager's effort level, x.49 A
higher effort level leads to higher total output created by the firm,
represented by y.50  However, greater effort lowers the private
benefits the manager receives, where B represents those benefits.5'
The other variable that the manager controls is the
distribution of the output created by the firm. The output is
divided among the manager, shareholders, and employees. The
manager receives aY, the shareholders receive S = j3Y, where a and
are proportions, and the employees receive W = (1 - ot - 3)Y. I
assume that a is fixed and that the manager chooses P. Both B and
W may be unverifiable, as private benefits to managers and some of
the surplus received by employees may take the form of job-related
perks and conditions that are hard to measure.
Although this article focuses on takeover threats, employee
control, and constituency statutes as ways of controlling managers,
there are of course other ways of providing incentives to managers
to make decisions in the firm's best interests. These include
5' 53managerial labor markets, reputation, and norms. I shall not
model these and other mechanisms in detail. Rather, I shall use a
reduced form approach 54 by assuming that the returns received by
shareholders (S) and employees (W) affect the private benefits that
the manager expects to receive (B). For example, if shareholders
49. x>0.
50. With dY/dx > 0 and dY/dx2 < 0 - the former condition merely says that
Y increases as x increases, and the latter is a technical condition needed to ensure
that the values given in the first order conditions below actually lead to maximum
outputs, not minimum outputs.
51. With aB/lx < 0 and 5eB/x 2 < 0 - these conditions are analogous to
those in the previous footnote.
52. See Fama, supra note 38, at 292-95.
53. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735 (2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taPabstract-id=241403 (last visited May 16, 2004);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001).
54. That is, rather than explicitly modeling these other mechanisms, I shall
just throw their assumed effects into the effects of S and W on B.
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receive higher returns, then the manager will have a better
reputation and be able to do better in the labor market.55 Similarly,
if employees receive higher returns, then the manager will have
better relations with her fellow employees, will be able to induce
the employees to work harder, and will believe that she has better
conformed with a norm of fair dealing. Formally, I assume that B is
a function of S and W as well as x (the manager's effort level), with
56increases in either S or W leading to an increase in B. Given these
returns, the manager will choose x and 03 to maximize B + axY,
which is called the manager's objective function.
We want to consider how the manager will choose x and B
given this objective function, and in later sections compare those
choices with how she would set x and B in the presence of a
takeover threat, constituency statute, or employee governance.
The tool by which economists determine how such choices are
made is called the first order condition-this defines the choices of
x and B that maximize the manager's objective function. In Table
1, 1 have collected the first order conditions for both this version of
the model and for the variants on that model, which we shall
explore in later sections. For this basic version, the first order
condition with respect to x is:
aB 8fi' B~ ((l-a-Pi( B ))dY
Ox J dx (1)
We can get some perspective on this choice of x by comparing
it with the social optimum. Let us for now define the social
optimum simply.5 1 Suppose that the social welfare function simply
adds the private benefits received by the manager and the net
output generated by the firm, B + Y. Suppose further that the
effects of S and W on B are simply distributional, and do not affect
net welfare. Then the social welfare problem is to choose x to
maximize B (x) + Y(x). The first order condition is:
OB dY
Ox dx
Comparing (1) with (3), several points emerge. First, if a = 1,
55. See Fama, supra note 38, at 292-95.
56. That is, 0B/0S > 0 and 8B/aW > 0.
57. Later on we shall consider some complications based on distributional
concerns. Note that the optimum social welfare is the social optimum.
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then the firm achieves the social optimum. This is no surprise: in
that case, the manager bears all costs and receives all the benefits. 5s
I assume that wealth constraints and imperfect debt markets
require that (x < 1-that is, to fund the company the manager must
bring in other shareholders. Second, if aB/S = aB/aW = 1, then
the firm will again achieve the social optimum. That is, if the
mechanisms summed up by the effect of S and W on B succeed in
making the manager fully internalize the effects her choices of x
and 3 have on shareholders and employees, then we again achieve
the social optimum. I shall assume that those other mechanisms
have some effect, but they are less than perfect.59 Given those two
assumptions, the manager's choice of x given by equation (1) will
be less than the social optimum given by equation (3). The
manager bears the full private costs of effort (B), but gets only a
fraction of the gains in output which that effort achieves. Hence,
she will work less hard than we would like her to work. Thus, there
is room for other mechanisms to help align the incentives of
managers with the interests of the other two constituencies.
The manager also must choose the distribution of output
between shareholders and employees. The first order condition of
the manager's objective function with respect to 03 is:
B aB (2)
as aw
The manager equalizes the marginal effects of changes to the
shareholders' and employees' shares on the private benefits that
the manager receives.
IV. THE THREAT OF A TAKEOVER
In the basic model of section III, the manager has an incentive
to expend too little effort-that is, to set x too low. In this section
we consider the first of several possible additional mechanisms to
58. This is a standard result.
59. In particular, 0 < aB/aS, aB/aW < 1.
60. I assume that no side bargaining occurs among the manager,
shareholders and employees, and I also set aside possible general equilibrium
effects. Such effects might limit the ability of those managers to set how much
employees and shareholders actually receive. I also assume that the amount
received by employees and shareholders, and total output, are not observable by
third parties, and thus a legally binding contract cannot be written that sets those
levels. This may be, for instance, because a part of the return that employees
receive is the quality of their working conditions.
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improve the incentives the manager faces. This section introduces
the threat that the firm may be taken over and the manager
punished, e.g., by being fired. The chances of a takeover are tied
to the gains that shareholders receive: the higher the gain to
shareholders (S), the lower the probability of a takeover.
Formally, let p(S) be the probability of a takeover, with the
probability decreasing as S increases." If there is no takeover, the
manager's return is as above. If there is a takeover, then the
manager is penalized by an amount P, i.e., her return is -P." The
manager's objective function is then (1 - p) (B + axY) - pP.
The first order function giving the manager's choice of effort
level x is:
8 (~ dC' DY)(B+ aY + P>5
aBa aB dY
- + ~ ( f- ( -- 8) I I
axas aW) dx
While slightly complicated, (5) can be fairly easily compared
with (1), the first order condition for x in the absence of a takeover
threat. For (5) to hold, it must be that x is greater than the x that
satisfies (1) .63 That is, the threat of a takeover induces the manager
to choose a higher effort level x. That is no surprise: because a
takeover penalizes the manager, and because increasing x reduces
the chances of a takeover, the takeover threat naturally induces the
manager to set x higher than if the threat did not exist.
The manager can also determine 3. How does the takeover
threat affect that choice? The new first order condition for
choosing 3 is:
( B 8B_-(B + aY+P) (6)P c aw dS)
Because the right-hand side of (6) is negative and 1 - p is
61. That is, dp/dS < 0. Note that the probability of a takeover with respect to
shareholder gain is p(S), but for the sake of clarity, the variable S will be omitted
hereinafter.
62. P>0.
63. To see this, note that the bracketed expression on the right-hand side of
(5) contains (1). Since the left hand side of (5) is negative, and 1 - p > 0, for (5)
to hold we must have: aB/x < M*lB/S +((1 - a - P)aB/aW)dY/dx. Given the
second order conditions for B(x) and Y(x), this can happen only if x is greater
than the x that satisfies (1).
12452004]
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
positive, for (6) to hold we must have aB/8S < aB/OW.
Comparing this with (2), the condition for choosing 3 with no
takeover threat, and again taking into account the second order
conditions, we see that the share that shareholders receive must be
set relatively higher with the threat of a takeover than without,
meaning that the share that employees receive must be lower.
Again, this makes sense. The manager wants to reduce the threat
of a takeover, and because the probability of a takeover is tied to
how much shareholders receive, the takeover threat induces the
manager to increase the relative share of output given to
shareholders.
The threat of a takeover thus has divergent effects on the three
constituencies. Shareholders are better off: the total output of the
firm increases, and their share of that output also increases.
Managers are worse off: a takeover, if it occurs, makes them worse
off, and in response they devote more effort to increasing firm
output than they would if they did not face that threat.
The effect on employees of the takeover threat is ambiguous.
On the one hand, the threat increases the total firm output
available to be divided up among the constituencies. On the other
hand, their share of that output decreases. Either effect could
predominate.
What can we say about social welfare as a result of the takeover
threat? We saw in the previous section that in the absence of such a
threat the manager sets effort too low. The takeover threat
increases the manager's effort. Thus, at least for a low probability
of takeover, the manager's effort level is closer to the social
optimum as a result of the takeover threat. However, there are at
least three caveats to that statement.
First, the statement ignores P. If P is merely a redistributional
effect rather than a deadweight social loss, that may be acceptable.
64
If P is a deadweight social loss, then we must revise the social
welfare function to equal B + Y - pP. The comparison of the social
optimum with what the manager chooses is then more
complicated.
Second, with a higher probability of a takeover, the incentive
can overshoot-that is, the takeover threat can induce the manager
to choose x higher than the social optimum.
Third, society may care about distributional effects. As used so
64. Although, see the third caveat in the text below.
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far, the social welfare function simply adds the amounts received by
the three constituencies. We may, however, care about who
receives the net product. For instance, if employees are typically
less wealthy than shareholders, and we value income equality, then
a mechanism that increases total wealth created but decreases the
amount that employees receive may not be attractive.
V. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AS A SHIELD
The threat of a takeover makes the manager worse off. She is
thus willing to take action to reduce or eliminate that threat. This
action may itself be costly, e.g., by diverting some of the manager's
time and attention that could otherwise be spent on productive
activity. Reductions in the probability of a takeover, either
achieved by such action or exogenously, will lessen the effects
analyzed in the previous subsection. The existence and contours of
a court-imposed fiduciary duty on the manager is one factor
affecting the probability of a takeover. If courts impose a strict
fiduciary duty that discourages antitakeover defenses, then the
probability of a takeover will be higher and the manager will be
able to lower that probability less with a given expenditure of effort.
A weak fiduciary duty has the opposite effect.
Suppose the manager can choose to expend d66 on putting in
place takeover defenses that reduce the possibility of a takeover.
The probability of a takeover, p(d, S), is now a function of
expenditure on d as well as the return to shareholders, with the
probability of a takeover decreasing as the manager spends more
on d."
The manager now chooses x, 13, and d to maximize (1 - p) (B +
cxY) - pP - d. The first order condition with respect to d is -
ap/ad(B + aY+ P) = 1.
65. Law and economics scholars often argue that we should use tax policy to
achieve whatever distribution of income we desire. Other legal policies, including
corporate law, should be set only to maximize efficiency. The argument is that tax
policy redistributes income at less cost to efficiency than do other policies. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). However, recent work
calls this argument into question. See Chris W. Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New
Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); see also Daniel A. Farber &
Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87
MINN. L. REv. 1817, 1824-26 (2003).
66. d>0.
67. ap/ad < 0 and a p/ad2 < 0.
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Now, imagine that a change in fiduciary duty rules makes it
easier for the manager to block a takeover with a given level of
expenditure-the (probably weak) effect of current constituency
statutes. Formally this means that 1p/Ddl is greater for a given d;
that is, a change in d has a greater effect on decreasing p, the
probability of a takeover. From the above first order condition and
the fact that a p/8d' < 0, this implies that the manager's optimal
choice of d will increase. As a result, the probability of a takeover
will decrease. This makes sense: if it becomes easier to block a
takeover, the manager will spend more on avoiding a takeover.
This change in fiduciary duty has two effects on the social
surplus. First, the increase in d is a direct social cost. Second,
there is the effect induced by the decreased probability of a
takeover. From the previous subsection we saw that a lower
probability of a takeover means that the manager chooses a lower
level of effort. This lowers the social surplus. It also reduces the
manager's incentive to transfer a greater share of the surplus to
shareholders. Thus, shareholders are unambiguously hurt by the
weakening of the fiduciary duty. The effect on employees is
ambiguous: they will get a bigger share of a smaller pie.
VI. EMPLOYEE GOVERNANCE
Now consider the possibility of employee governance as a
mechanism for checking managerial opportunism. Suppose that if
employees are dissatisfied with their return they might replace the
manager. This may be because they have enough votes on the
board to remove the manager or possibly through the threat of a
leveraged buyout, perhaps financed through an employee stock
ownership plan, to take control of the firm.
The model of how this threat works is formally very similar to
the model of a takeover threat in section IV. Let q(W) be the
probability that employees remove the manager, with that
•68
probability decreasing as employees' share of output increases. If
there is no removal, the manager's return is as in section II. If
employees remove the manager, then the manager receives a
return of-p.69 The manager's objective function is then (1 -q) (B +
68. dq/dW < 0. Note that although the probability that employees will
remove the manager is q(W), for clarity, the variable W will be omitted
hereinafter.
69. P> 0.
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aY) - qP.
The first order condition with respect to x is:
(I ka -f A j(-Y(B + aY + PdW dx(7)
ac B cB (1 '8aB dY
-q"x+ a + L9+-a W )
We should compare (7) with (1), the first order condition for
the choice of effort in the absence of a takeover threat and
employee governance, and with (5), the first order condition for
choosing effort with a takeover threat. By the same argument as
with the comparison of (5) with (1), the threat of employee
removal induces the manager to choose a higher effort level x than
if there is no such threat and no takeover threat. 0 The intuition is
also the same: the manager will work harder to increase output,
and hence how much the employees receive, and thereby reduce
71the chances of being fired. It is less straightforward to compare
the choice of effort under the threat of employee removal as
opposed to under the threat of a takeover-it depends on the
relative responsiveness of p and q (the probabilities of removal) to
changes in S or W (the amount of output received by shareholders
or employees).
The manager can also set 3. The first order condition for this
choice under the threat of employee removal is:
(q-q ( _ a= (B+aY+P) (8)
aw as) dW
Because the right-hand side of (8) is negative and 1 - q is
positive, for (8) to hold we must have aB/8W < SB/aS.
Comparing this with (2), the condition for choosing 3 with no
takeover or employee removal threat, and with (6), which holds
under the threat of a takeover, and taking into account the second
order conditions, we see that the share that employees receive must
be set relatively higher with the threat of employee removal than if
neither threat exists, and the employee share is higher with neither
threat than with a threat of a takeover. Managers want to reduce
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. See Section IV.
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the threat of being removed. When that threat comes from
employees, they see that employees get more of the firm's surplus;
when the threat comes from shareholders, managers give them a
greater share of the pie.72
The threat of employee removal is thus the mirror image of
the takeover threat analyzed in section IV. It has mirror effects on
the three constituencies in our model. Employees are now better
off than with no threat: the total output of the firm increases, and
their share of that output also increases. Managers are worse off:
employee removal, if it occurs, negatively affects managers, and in
response they put forth more effort than they would in the absence
of a threat. The effect on shareholders is ambiguous as compared
with the case of no threat: total firm output is higher due to the
threat of removal, but the shareholder share of that output
decreases.
VII. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AS A SWORD
Finally, consider a different possible application of the
fiduciary duty concept. In section V the manager's fiduciary duty
was considered insofar as it affected the manager's ability to defend
against a takeover threat. The fiduciary duty concept could instead
be applied directly to the manager's decision-making within the
firm. If either shareholders or employees believe that the manager
has behaved in a way that does not maximize returns to the firm,
they could sue and seek to have the manager disgorge her gains.
Assuming that employees can sue goes beyond current corporate
constituency statutes, which do not grant standing to employees.
The formal model of this possibility is similar to that for the
takeover threat and the threat of removal by employees. Suppose
that with some probability the manager will be found guilty of a
74
violation of fiduciary duty, r(Y). An individual shareholder or
employee chooses whether or not to sue the manager for breach of
fiduciary duty. The probability of liability is a decreasing function
of the surplus generated by the firm, Y.75 If the manager is found
liable she is penalized by an amount, L; otherwise, she receives the
72. See generally Mitchell, supra note 26.
73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
74. Note that although the function r(Y) is the probability that the manager
will be found guilty of a fiduciary duty violation, for clarity, the variable Y will be
omitted hereinafter.
75. Thus, dr/dY < 0, and d 2r/dY2 < 0.
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managerial return as defined in section III.
The manager's objective function is now (1 - r) (B + aY) - rL.
The first order function with respect to x is:
drY + aY + L) = (9)(l dx rf aB +( a B (1 -, aB ) dY
ax as DW) dx)
Comparing (9) with (1), the first order condition in the
absence of a threat of suit, takeover, or employee removal, we see
by the same logic as with (5) and (7) above that (9) results in a
higher choice of effort, x, and hence higher firm output, y.76
Again, the choice of x in the presence of the threat of a lawsuit is
trickier as compared with the choice of x under the takeover and
employee removal threats, depending on the relative
responsiveness of p, q, and r to changes in the amount received.
The other choice variable is the share that employees receive.
The first order condition for this is:
eB aB
-= (10)
aw as
Expression (10) is the same expression as (2), which gives the
distributive choice in the absence of any of the three threats
considered in the elaborations of the basic model.7 That is, unlike
the takeover and employee removal threats, the lawsuit threat
considered here does not induce the manager to shift the
distribution of the surplus from employees to shareholders or vice
versa. That is because in this model, both shareholders and
employees can sue for a violation of fiduciary duty. The chances of
getting sued only depend on the total income produced, Y, not on
how much goes to either of the two constituencies. Note how this
varies from current practice. As things stand, only shareholders
can sue for a violation of fiduciary duty. One would thus expect
this to induce managers to transfer income to shareholders.
Expanded constituency statutes that gave employees standing to
sue as well would change that effect.
Although formally similar (in this model) to the threats of
76. See supra notes 62 and 69 and accompanying text.
77. The first order condition is actually -dr/dp3(B + ctY) + (1 - r) (aB/W +
aB/0S)Y - dr/dp3*L = 0. However, since r depends only on Y and changing 13 does
not affect Y in this model, dr/dp3 = 0 and this expression reduces to (10).
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takeover and removal by employee, there are a variety of reasons to
expect that this use of fiduciary law would add less to the
disciplining of managers. First, the penalty imposed on the
manager is typically weaker, i.e., L < p.s Second, courts are
generally reluctant to find liability in managerial operating
decisions, a reluctance doctrinally expressed by the business
judgment rule.79 Formally, this means that r is likely to be near 0.
Third, if courts are not very good at determining whether a
manager's actions have subtracted value from the firm, then the
probability of liability will not be very responsive to performance,
i.e., r/Y is likely to be small. Of course, these effects also imply
that while the fiduciary duty check is unlikely to act as a strong
deterrent, it is also less likely to over-deter and induce a higher-
than-optimal effort level, a risk that all three mechanisms share in
theory.
One must compare the costs of the mechanisms as well as their
benefits. The takeover mechanism involves monitoring by outside
takeover specialists of many potential targets, plus the considerable
costs involved in the takeover itself. Moreover, managers may
engage in costly defensive actions that reduce the chances of a
takeover without increasing output. Monitoring costs of employee
governance may be relatively low, as employees monitor how
managers are performing as a byproduct of doing their jobs, but
employees may face significant collective action costs in
coordinating their decision-making, 0 and there may be influenceS 81
costs as managers lobby employees to preserve their jobs.
Litigation costs are the most obvious cost for the fiduciary duty
mechanism. There may also be some costs in monitoring and
searching for firms where suits have a good chance of success,
although allowing employees to sue may reduce these costs
considerably. The legal mechanism reduces or eliminates the
collective action issues that occur for the removal mechanism. The
legal mechanism may create some incentive to take costly action to
reduce the chance of a suit, although offhand this would seem a
78. See generally FRANKLINA. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw § 4.1.3 (2000).
79. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 269-86.
80. The problem arises because employees typically have more diverse
interests in the corporation than do shareholders, and hence more cause for
dispute. See HANsMANN, supra note 46, at 89-92.
81. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the
Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPEcTIVES ON PosITrvE POLITIcAL ECONOMY
(J. Alt & K. Shepsle eds., 1990).
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less-serious problem than the comparable incentives arising under
the other two mechanisms. Thus, it seems the legal mechanism is
likely to provide low expected benefits, but also low costs, as
compared to the other two.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Theoretical analyses like those in sections III through VII
above, without more, prove nothing about the real world. I hope
the models presented are suggestive, however. In particular, I
hope to have suggested the following points.
A. Economic models should take into account a variety of stakeholder
groups beyond managers and shareholders.
Althou h in theory the nexus of contracts approach to the
corporation recognizes that many different groups interact
through the corporate form, most formal models of the
corporation use a principal/agent framework that focuses on
managers as the agents of shareholders and ignores employees.
Separate models treat employees as agents of the firm. Modeling
needs to go beyond this framework and consider the simultaneous
interaction of managers, shareholders, and employees. The
models of sections III through VII have considered how executive
compensation, takeover threats, fiduciary duty, and employee
governance may affect the behavior of shareholders, managers, and
employees, and in turn how the equilibrium outcomes affect the
payoffs that those three parties receive. The model used is quite
simple, and merely illustrative. Although some work has gone
beyond the shareholder/manager model, more needs to be done.
B. Although most commentators have concluded that transfers from
employees are not an important factor in hostile takeovers, that
issue isfarfrom conclusively decided.
After Shleifer and Summers suggested that observed
shareholder gains from takeovers may be explained in part by
losses to other stakeholders, and in particular employees of target
corporations, a relatively modest amount of empirical literature has
82. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 48.
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examined this point.s4 The widely believed verdict on this point is
that transfers from employees or other stakeholder groups to
shareholders are small to nonexistent. In the case of employees,
the literature has mainly focused on data concerning employment
and wage levels, finding little evidence of drops in either as a
response to hostile takeovers.
The model presented here raises at least two questions about
this conclusion. First, it may well be the threat of hostile takeovers,
rather than the actual occurrence of takeovers, has the main effect.
Note that it is this threat of takeovers, rather than the actual
aftermath of a finished takeover, on which the above models focus.
Testing the effect of threatened takeovers on employees rather
than executed takeovers is much harder, and I do not believe it has
been done yet. Second, the harm to employees may come not in
layoffs or wage cuts, but rather in uncompensated or
undercompensated worsening of employment conditions-harder
work, longer hours, less generous training, and so on. The only
paper I am aware of that has tried to test for such harms has found
85
a significant effect. The variable used in that paper is crude
enough that the result is far from conclusive, but it is at least
suggestive.
C. There is a redistributive argument in favor of afiduciary duty
favoring employees.
If one finds the previous point plausible, namely that takeovers
and takeover threats can harm employees, then it is not clear that
fiduciary duties should run only in favor of shareholders. Sections
III through V found that managerial opportunism can reduce the
total surplus, that the takeover threat can limit this effect, and
hence that a weakened fiduciary duty that allows managers to
defend against takeovers more easily will tend to reduce the total
social surplus. However, because the takeover threat may hurt
employees, the revised fiduciary duty may help them by reducing
that takeover threat. If one is firmly convinced in the goal of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and nothing else, then so what? However,
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, more than Pareto efficiency, can be
questioned as a social goal. This is particularly true where
efficiency suggests a scheme that benefits shareholders at the
84. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
85. See Becker, supra note 343.
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expense of employees, given that shareholders are on average
wealthier than employees. Although the standard law and
economics line is that redistributive goals should be ignored in a
policy area such as this, and instead pursued through tax and
transfer instruments, this line has come under some attack8 6
D. While a revised fiduciary duty and increased employee governance
may both help tilt the playing field toward employees, the revised
fiduciary duty does so at the cost of lessened discipline of managers,
while employee governance provides a new tool for strengthening the
discipline of managers.
Although I am not nearly as opposed to constituency statutes
as many writers on the subject, they do strike me as problematic.
The problem is that their main effect is loosening court-imposed
discipline on corporate managers. Although this may help
employees in the takeover context,8 the statutes come at a cost.
True, a revised fiduciary duty could be used outside the takeover
context to affirmatively push managers to take actions that favor
groups other than just shareholders (as modeled in section VII).
However, for a variety of practical reasons this use of the
constituency statutes seems unlikely. Not only does the business
judgment rule and the limited capacity of courts work against it,
but the limits of the statutes themselves also strongly discourage
this use."'
In contrast, employee involvement in corporate governance
works as a potentially powerful additional mechanism to control
managerial opportunism and to direct the corporation toward
greater efficiency. Employees have an abundance of information
on the functioning of the corporation and managers, and
incentives to use that information to improve the corporation's
performance, if given a way to do so.89 Although a variety of
mechanisms exist to limit managerial opportunism, this is a
potentially powerful alternative with much to commend it. This is
not to deny the many objections to employee involvement in
governance, nor to try to resolve the numerous issues that arise in
86. See supra note 65.
87. As mentioned above, the effect of these statutes has actually been, in all
likelihood, quite limited, either for good or for bad.
88. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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considering it. That goes beyond the bounds of this article. My
point here is simply that employee governance is potentially a
much more powerful and useful reform than corporate
constituency statutes. Still, if employee involvement in corporate
governance is otherwise undesirable or politically infeasible, and if
the distributive effect of takeovers on employees is of great
concern, constituency statutes may be defensible. I do not believe
there is currently enough systematic evidence of a strong negative
effect of takeovers on employees for this argument to persuade me,
on balance.
To restate the basic point: the threat of a takeover serves to
discipline managerial opportunism. However, it also makes
managers shift returns to shareholders from other groups, such as
employees, because a high return to shareholders reduces the
probability of a takeover. Constituency statutes, to the extent they
do anything, reduce the distributive effect of takeovers by reducing
the probability of takeovers, and thus also reduce the positive
disciplinary effect takeovers provide. Employee governance can
function like a takeover threat to impose discipline on managers.
Unlike takeovers, employee governance induces managers to shift
returns from shareholders to employees, as high returns to
employees become more important to managers' well-being. Thus,
employee governance may achieve the distributive shift from
shareholders to employees that justifies constituency statutes, with
lower managerial misbehavior.
I realize that I have not gone into much detail in this article as
to exactly what I mean by employee governance. As noted earlier,9'
the formal model focuses mainly on forms of governance that give
employees the ability to remove managers. Thus, employee
representation on the board of directors, or forms of large-scale
employee ownership that allow employees to vote for the board, are
what I have in mind here. These forms of employee governance
are especially attractive if one believes that employees, through
their daily activities, naturally gain pertinent information about the
performance of high-level managers. If one instead believes that
employees have a particular advantage in information that is most
useful at lower levels of decision-making, then other forms of
employee governance, such as works councils or quality circles, may
90. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 45.
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be more attractive. These different forms of employee governance
may also differ in their costs. I will have to tackle those issues in a
later article.
I should mention one argument that is sometimes made in
defense of constituency statutes. Even after acknowledging their
limits, supporters sometimes argue that the statutes may help to
move values and beliefs in the direction of greater involvement of
employees and other stakeholders in corporate governance.9 This
argument fits with a recent spate of work on the norm-influencing
effects of law.93 This is not the place to evaluate that work.
However, at least in the context of constituency statutes, any effect
of those statutes on popular beliefs or values is certainly very far
from proven. I find it hard to believe that relatively obscure
corporate law statutes, which have been very rarely invoked in
practice, have had or will have much influence on public norms.
Scholars and activists who yearn for greater employee
involvement in corporate governance should advocate measures
that successfully accomplish this goal. Whether this should be
through private or public initiative, or indeed whether it is
ultimately an attractive goal at all, are questions I leave for another
day. However, telling corporate managers that they should, or may,
take employee interests into account does nothing to make
employees themselves actually more involved in decision-making.
Nor do other arguments, on balance, make a compelling case in
favor of corporate constituency statutes.
92. See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 641-43; Katherine Van Wetzel Stone,
Employees As Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON
L. REv. 45, 69-72(1991).
93. For examples in the corporate law area, see supra note 53.
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Table 1: First Order Conditions for Choice of x and j3 in
Various Versions of the Model
Basic version: (1)
Choice of x aB 8 -s iB i
ax _ a B ( dx
Basic version: (2) a B a B
Choice of 3
Social (3) aB dY
optimum: =
Choice of x Ox dx
Takeover (5) ( 1(
threat: dS ( aY+ P=
Choice of x A
(i-p}(aB k(I aR B dY(IP xas aw' dx'
Takeover (6) / aBaB p
threat: (Ip) - --__) (= +aY+P)
Choice of a3 a- S = B Y+dS)
Employee (7) a d f ( d (
governance: (-a d B +aY+P)=
Choice of x dW BB
a + ,8-O+ (i-,a B Y
Employee (8) aB B q(
governance: ( - q B B (B + ay + P)
Choice of3 W 8as dW
Constituency (9) ( dr dY)B
statute as dI-(B + aY+L)=
sword:
Choice ofx (i-r OB+ + OB " dY)
ax Os 8W) )
Constituency (10) B OB
statute as
sword: aw as
Choice of j3
1258 [Vol. 30:4
CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY
Table 2: Variables, Functions, and their Values
Variable Represents
x Manager's Effort Level
Y Firm Output
B Private Benefits Manager Receives
W Benefits Employees Receive
S Benefits Shareholders Receive
P Amount Manager is Penalized if a Take-Over
Occurs
L Amount Manager is Penalized if Found Liable for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
d Amount Manager Spends on Implementing
Takeover Defenses
Function Represents
q (W) Probability that Employees Remove Manager
r(Y) Probability that Manager will be Found Guilty of a
Fiduciary Duty Violation
p (S) Probability of a Takeover
p (d, S) Probability of a Takeover if a Manager is Able to
Implement Takeover Defenses
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